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The theoretical literature on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) indicates that they 
could be either substitutes or complements. The empirical evidence on U.S.-Japan and 
APEC countries suggests that trade and FDI exhibit a complementary relationship. In this 
paper, we employ a six-region applied general equilibrium model that incorporates FDI to 
evaluate the impact of APEC trade and investment liberalization on output and the 
interplay between FDI and trade adjustments. The preliminary results suggest that FDI 
liberalization would bring about greater benefits to most of the APEC economies than 
trade liberalization. In the manufacturing sector, trade and FDI are found to be 
complements in the APEC regions. 
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  In the past two decades, inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have facilitated 
economic development and technology transfer in many developing countries. During the 
1986-99 period, world FDI flows increased at an annual rate of 22.9 percent, significantly 
faster than the growth rate of world trade (UNCTAD, 2000). Developing countries hosted 
30.1 percent of inward FDI stock in 1999, sharply higher than 21.0 percent share in 1990. 
Among developing countries, East and Southeast Asia hosted 51.4 percent of inward FDI 
stock in 1999, down slightly from 52.8 percent share in 1997. The relative decline in FDI 
flows to this region may be attributable to the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98. 
  FDI is subject to a number of impediments, including restrictions on entry and 
establishment, ownership and control restrictions, operational restrictions (e.g., local 
content requirements), and lack of transparency in laws and regulations.
1  Such 
impediments distort capital allocation across countries, between foreign and domestic 
investment, and between FDI and portfolio investment (Hardin and Holmes, 1997). 
Barriers to FDI are relatively high in services, such as finance, insurance, and 
communications. 
  Host countries may not benefit from inward FDI when there are domestic 
distortions. Naya (1990) shows that liberalization of FDI could reduce economic welfare 
in a protected economy. This is because protection in the host country would induce 
foreign investors to make non-optimal FDI decisions. Fry (1993) finds that inward FDI 
contributed significantly to economic growth in East Asian developing countries where the 
extent of domestic distortions, such as trade controls and financial repression, were 
relatively low. By contrast, in a group of developing countries with relatively high 
domestic distortions, inward FDI were associated with a low or negative growth.
2 
  FDI and trade can be substitutes or complements. The theoretical literature 
indicates that they can be either of them depending upon the assumptions (e.g., Mundell, 
                                                 
1  See PECC (1995, Chapter 6) and Hardin and Holmes (1997) for further information on 
impediments to FDI, particularly in the APEC economies. 
2 Fry (1993) divides the sample of sixteen developing countries between one group consisting of 
five East Asian countries (Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) and the other 
consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, 
and Venezuela. The estimation period is 1966-88 with the exception of Brazil (1966-85), Chile 
(1966-84), Indonesia (1967-88), and Pakistan (1968-88). 3 
1957; Markusen, 1983; Neary and Ruane, 1988; Wong, 1986, 1995). The empirical 
evidence on the United States and Japan suggests that bilateral FDI and trade flows are 
complements in many manufacturing sectors (Kawai and Urata, 1998; Lee and Roland-
Holst, 1998). Petri (1997) finds that not only inward and outward FDI stocks are reduced 
when investment liberalization is excluded from APEC liberalization but trade flows also 
tend to decline, particularly for China and ASEAN-4 countries, compared with full 
liberalization. This result suggests that FDI and trade are likely to be complements at the 
economywide level in the APEC economies. 
  To evaluate the impact of APEC trade and investment liberalization on economic 
welfare and the interplay between FDI and trade adjustments, we use a six-region, three-
sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The next section provides an 
overview of FDI patterns and barriers in the APEC economies. Section 3 contains a brief 
description of the model used for quantitative assessments. In section 4, we present the 
aggregate and sectoral results of liberalization experiments, and the final section offers 
conclusions. 
 
2.  FDI Patterns and Impediments in the APEC Economies 
2.1 Patterns  of  FDI 
  Developing members of APEC have benefited from FDI inflows from more 
developed members. The growth in FDI flows has generally led to greater diversification 
of production and higher rates of growth in trade and productivity. Although the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98 caused a sharp decline in real GDP in several East Asian 
countries, FDI flows to most of the APEC economies have remained at high levels, with 
the exception of Indonesia. 
  Table 1 provides inward and outward FDI stocks of selected economies in 1995. 
UNCTAD computes these stock values as the accumulation of FDI flows at historical cost. 
The original source of the data on FDI inflows and outflows is International Monetary 
Fund’s Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. For some economies (e.g., Hong Kong), 
FDI flows are estimated because there are no balance of payments data.
3 The world FDI 
                                                 
3 See UNCTAD (1999, pp. 465-476). Ramstetter (2000) provides estimates for FDI flows in eleven 
Asian economies during the 1980-99 period.  4 
stock was about $2.8 trillion in 1995. About 38 percent of inward FDI was hosted by the 
European Union, 19 percent by the United States, and 5 percent by China. The European 
Union, the United States, and Japan owned 46, 25, and 8 percent, respectively, of the 
world FDI stock. 
 
 
Table 1.  Inward and Outward FDI Stocks of Selected Economies, 1995 
     
  Inward FDI Stock  Outward FDI Stock 
  US$ million  % of GDP  US$ million  % of GDP 
United States  535,553  7.7   696,092  10.0  
Canada  123,335 22.0    120,297 21.5   
Australia  100,390 28.8   47,186 13.5   
New Zealand  26,177  43.8   7,675  12.8  
Japan  33,531 0.7    238,452 4.7   
China  131,241  18.8   15,802  2.3  
Hong  Kong  70,951 50.6   85,156 60.7   
Korea  10,478 2.3    10,231 2.2   
Taiwan  15,736 6.0    25,144 9.7   
Singapore  59,582 71.2   35,050 41.9   
Indonesia  50,601  25.6   1,295  0.7  
Malaysia  27,094 31.8   11,143 13.1   
Philippines  6,086 8.2   1,209 1.6   
Thailand  17,452  10.5   2,173  1.3  
Mexico  41,130  14.3   4,132  1.4  
Chile  15,547  23.1   2,815  4.2  
European Union 1,066,934  12.7   1,295,941  15.4  
World  2,789,585  9.9   2,840,216  10.2  




  Among the APEC economies, Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Malaysia 
have had high inward FDI stock to GDP ratios. By contrast, Japan has attracted very little 
FDI relative to the size of its economy. According to the data on the FDI stocks by source 
and destination regions that are calibrated to the FTAP model (Hanslow et al., 1999), 
Japan and the United States together accounted for more than 50 percent of inward FDI 
stocks in Hong Kong, Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand in 1995. Singapore and 
Taiwan each accounted for over 10 percent of Malaysia’s inward stock, whereas the EU 
contributed over 20 percent of inward stock in Singapore. Over a half of inward FDI stock 
in China was sourced from Hong Kong. It is important to note, however, that a large share 5 
of Hong Kong’s outward FDI is undertaken by foreign-owned firms,
4 a sizable portion of 
which is “round-tripping FDI” that originates from parent firms in China and is then 
channeled back into China through affiliates in Hong Kong (Low et al., 1996; Ramstetter, 
2000). 
2.2  Barriers to FDI 
  According to UNCTAD (1996), barriers to FDI may be classified into the 
following three categories: 
(1) Restrictions on market entry, which include restrictions on the share of foreign 
ownership, screening and approval, restrictions on the legal form of the foreign 
entity, minimum capital requirements, and conditions on location. 
(2) Ownership and control restrictions, which contain compulsory joint ventures with 
domestic investors, limits on the number of foreign board members, government 
approval required for certain decisions, and mandatory transfer of some ownership 
to locals after a specified time. 
(3) Operational restrictions, which include performance requirements (e.g., minimum 
exports to output ratios), local content requirements, restrictions on imports of 
labor, capital, and intermediate inputs, and restrictions on repatriation of capital 
and profits. 
 
  Previous studies that estimate barriers to FDI have concentrated on services sectors 
(e.g., Hoekman, 1995; Hardin and Holmes, 1997; Hanslow et al., 2000, Kaleeswaran et al., 
2000; Warren, 2000). This is because commercial presence abroad, primarily through FDI, 
is the most important means of delivering services to other countries. Hoekman (1995) 
uses frequency ratios of services barriers to estimate tariff equivalent measures of relative 
restrictiveness of barriers to services trade across countries and sectors. His estimates are 
based on judgmental benchmark tariff equivalents for each sector to reflect a country that 
is highly restricted in market access.  
  Hoekman’s (1995) estimates have been used by Brown et al. (1996) and Petri 
(1997) in their model simulations. Table 2 summarizes ad valorem equivalents of FDI 
barriers used by Petri. The rates for the services sector are based on Hoekman’s estimates, 
whereas the rates for the primary and manufacturing sectors are assumed to be one-half as 
                                                 
4 This pattern is also observed in Singapore. 6 
high (relative to total costs) as tariff equivalents for these sectors that are available in the 
GTAP database, version 3 (Hertel, 1997). 
 
 
Table 2.  FDI Barriers Used by Petri (1997) 
(percent) 
  UCAN
a Japan  NIEs
b ASEAN-4 China  ROW 
Primary  6.4   48.3   34.7  14.5   21.6   16.6   
Manufacturing  34.6   25.7   22.7   44.6   61.1   32.5  
Services  80.7   79.1   70.4   70.1   77.0   76.6  
Notes:  a) United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
  b) Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
Source: Petri (1997). 
 
 
  Hardin and Holmes (1997) develop alternative indices of the relative 
restrictiveness of FDI. Their estimates are based upon information on actual restrictions 
not only on market access but also on other aspects of FDI. The weights on different types 
of barriers are set to reflect their relative restrictions. It is found that communications and 
financial services have some of the highest FDI barriers in the APEC economies. In 
communications, Thailand has the highest restrictiveness index (0.84), followed by China 
(0.82) and Philippines (0.76). In financial services, countries with high FDI restrictions 
include Philippines (0.95), Korea and Thailand (both with the value of 0.88).
5 
  Hanslow et al. (2000) compute ad valorem equivalents of barriers to establishment 
(impediments on capital) and those of barriers to ongoing operation (impediments on 
output) for both domestic and foreign firms. The results are provided in Table 3, which are 
based on estimates of impediment rates in banking (Kaleeswaran et al., 2000) and 
telecommunications (Warren, 2000). 
  Compared with Hoekman’s (1995) estimates on relative restrictiveness of barriers 
to services trade, the rates of impediments to establishment derived by Hanslow et al. 
(2000) are lower in all regions with the exception of China. Compared with Hardin and 
Holmes’s (1997) FDI restrictiveness indices, these rates are generally lower in all the 
APEC regions with the exceptions of China and Indonesia. Hanslow et al.’s (2000) 
                                                 
5 See Hardin and Holmes (1997, pp. 112-113) for detailed results. 7 
estimates have some shortcomings, however, because they are derived from the 
impediment rates in only banking and telecommunications services. 
 
 
Table 3.  Ad Valorem Equivalents of Barriers to Establishment and Ongoing Operations in 
the Services Sector 
(percent)       
  Barriers to Establishment  Barriers to Ongoing Operations
  Domestic Foreign  Domestic Foreign 
United States  0.0   3.8   0.1   1.1  
Canada  0.5   6.3   0.3   1.7  
Australia  0.6   14.3   0.0   0.7  
New Zealand  0.4   4.3   0.0   0.8  
Japan  0.3   3.0   3.6   4.7  
China  123.4   252.1   19.0   36.6  
Hong Kong  1.3   5.2   1.4   2.3  
Korea  1.9   22.6   5.1   6.9  
Taiwan  1.9   18.7   2.9   4.9  
Singapore  2.4   23.9   3.5   8.5  
Indonesia 22.7    68.2   13.3   28.2  
Malaysia  15.3   37.9   3.6   10.6  
Philippines  7.5   53.7   8.5   22.8  
Thailand  12.2   36.5   4.7   13.7  
Mexico  0.6   11.1   2.2   5.5  
Chile  14.1   20.6   3.0   4.1  
Rest of Cairns  7.2   19.4   1.0   5.5  
European Union  1.3   6.4   0.1   1.2  
Rest of World  39.4   87.8   5.0   13.9  
Source: Hanslow et al. (2000), Table 4. 
 
 
3. The  Model 
  Distinguishing between the activities of domestic and foreign-owned firms is an 
important feature of a CGE model that incorporates foreign direct investment. Petri (1997) 
assumes that product varieties are differentiated by firms headquartered in different 
regions. Under his demand structure, a foreign variety can be purchased from the local 
subsidiary of a foreign firm, the parent abroad, and the foreign firm’s subsidiaries located 
in third countries. A domestic variety can be obtained either from domestic producers or 
from foreign subsidiaries of the domestic firm. 
  We have extended a simple world CGE model developed by van der Mensbrugghe 
(2000) to include features of FDI, closely following those developed by Petri (1997). As in 8 
Petri the model contains six regions – UCAN (consisting of the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand), Japan, NIEs (consisting of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore), ASEAN-4, China, and the rest of the world – and three sectors (primary, 
manufacturing, and services). 
  The model equations are presented in the Appendix. Products are identified by 
ownership of capital, and these are called varieties. Thus output, XPr,i,v, is identified by 
region of production (r), by sector (i), and by variety (v). Similar to the simple model, 
production is modeled as a series of nested CES functions. However, each variable in the 
nest is associated with both a sector and a variety, and not simply a sector (see Eq. A.1, 
A.3 and A.5 in the Appendix). The main deviation from the simple model is that foreign-
owned production is assumed to import essential imports from its ‘home’ base. For 
example, Japanese auto plants in the United States import directly a fixed share (relative to 
output) of intermediate goods from Japan. 
  Household and government accounts are consolidated. The consolidated household 
sector accrues income from factor remuneration as well as tax receipts (Eq. A.11). Gross 
capital income is distributed three ways. Domestic households receive a share of after-tax 
capital remuneration. The share is determined by ownership percentage. By definition, 
domestic-variety capital is 100 percent owned locally. FDI-based capital is assumed to 
operate as a joint venture, where the share of foreign ownership, χ, is fixed. Thus 
χ percent of after-tax capital remuneration flows overseas (local re-investment of earnings 
is not allowed in the current version of the model). The third component of gross capital 
remuneration is the tax on capital. Impediments to FDI flows are modeled as ad valorem 
taxes on capital, and the capital tax rate, τ
k, is specific to varieties (Eq. A.13). 
  One important aspect in which our model differs from Petri is the order of CES 
nesting of demand for goods. In Petri’s demand structure, each agent first allocates 
expenditures between an aggregate of goods produced by firms headquartered in the home 
region and an aggregate of those produced by firms headquartered in foreign regions. In 
our model, as in Figure 1, each agent first allocates expenditures between an aggregate of 
goods produced domestically, including those produced by foreign plants located in the 
domestic economy, and an aggregate of all imports (Eq.  A.24 and A.25). Aggregate 
demand for goods produced domestically is split across all plants located domestically 
(Eq. A.27). At the other nest, we disaggregate by “own” varieties, i.e., those produced by 
domestic firms located abroad and an aggregate of foreign varieties produced abroad 9 
(Eq. A.29 and A.30). Own varieties are allocated across plant locations (Eq. A.32 and 
A.33),
6  whereas an aggregate of foreign varieties are first disaggregated by foreign 
ownership and finally across plant locations (Eq. A.35 and A.37).
7 
  The order of our demand nesting appears to be in accord with reality, particularly 
in services. For example, foreign banks in any given country generally provide services to 
fulfill the needs of domestic consumers. Thus, goods and services provided by domestic 
and foreign-owned firms in a given location appear to be closer substitutes than those 
provided by firms headquartered in the same country but produced in different locations. 
  The allocation of capital is modeled using the same CET transformation structure 
as in Petri (1997), which is shown in Figure 2. First, aggregate wealth for each region, Wr, 
is allocated across sectors as a function of the relative rate of return on capital invested in 
various sectors (Eq. A.51). Second, capital in each sector is allocated between domestic 
market and an aggregate of foreign markets (Eq. A.53 and A.54). Finally, foreign capital is 
allocated across plant locations (Eq. A.56). A reduction in FDI barriers would raise the 
after-tax rate of return to capital, PK
n, which leads to an increase in the inward FDI stock 
(Eq. A.53 and A.56). The world capital stock is assumed to be fixed. With finite 
elasticities of transformation, capital is less than perfectly mobile across regions and 
sectors. 
  Labor is assumed to be freely mobile across sectors but not across regions 
(Eq. A.49). Thus there is a single equilibrium wage rate for each region. The supply of 
labor is held constant. To produce output overseas, subsidiaries employ local labor, the 
stock of FDI, inputs sourced from parents, and other intermediate inputs. In the current 




                                                 
6 Equation (A.33) would typically be redundant. However, due to aggregation of regions, intra-
regional imports (imports of the domestic variety from r to r) would be represented by variable 
a
r d i r WTF , , , . 
7 The structure of demand nesting is similar to the one adopted in the FTAP model (Hanslow et al., 
1999).  
8  It may be more realistic to assume increasing-returns-to-scale and imperfectly competitive 
product markets. See, e.g., Brown and Stern (1999). 10 
 
Figure 1.  Structure of Domestic Demand 
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Figure 2.  Allocation of Wealth 
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  The model is calibrated to social accounting matrices (SAMs) of the six regions for 
the year 1992, constructed primarily from the GTAP database, version 3 (Hertel, 1997). 
We are currently in the process of updating to a more recent database. 
  Three caveats are needed to interpret the results of APEC trade and FDI 
liberalization experiments presented in the next section. First, we used the same protection 
rates on FDI as Petri (1997) in this preliminary version, and we suspect that these 
estimates are likely to be too high. Second, the process of APEC trade and investment 
liberalization started in 1997, but some APEC countries reduced trade and FDI barriers 
significantly between 1992 and 1997. Third, the current model is static and does not 
account for capital accumulation. However, the capital stock is expected to increase over 
time, particularly when the real return to capital increases. The first two factors would 
overestimate the results while the last factor would underestimate them. 
 
4. Computational  Results 
  We have conducted three APEC liberalization experiments: (1) the five APEC 
regions remove trade barriers on a Most-Favored Nation (MFN) basis, (2) they reduce 
barriers to FDI by 50 percent on an MFN basis, and (3) the combination of (1) and (2). We 
first examine aggregate results in section 4.1, followed by assessments of sectoral results 
in section 4.2. 
4.1 Aggregate  Results 
  Table 4 summarizes aggregate results from three APEC liberalization experiments. 
In the aggregate, world real GDP would gain $100 billion from trade liberalization, $339 
billion from FDI liberalization, and $441 from the combination of the two. These 
estimates should be interpreted with caution because the ad valorem equivalents of FDI 
barriers used in the model may be biased upward, particularly for UCAN. 
  All five APEC regions would realize gains in real GDP from trade liberalization, 
ranging from 0.2 percent for UCAN to 2.5 percent for ASEAN-4 (column 4). Both imports 
and exports increase substantially with the exception of the rest of the world (ROW). It 
may be puzzling at first why ROW’s GDP and exports fall despite APEC trade 
liberalization is nondiscriminatory toward ROW. It is mainly caused by a large decline in 
its exports of primary products to Japan and NIEs. UCAN is the leading supplier of 13 
primary products to these regions, and its exports of primary products surge after the 
removal of trade barriers. This is because the export price of UCAN relative to that of 
ROW falls, resulting from a reduction in the average cost brought about by a fall in the 
price of imported intermediate inputs. 
 
 
Table 4.  Aggregate Results from APEC Liberalization 
  Absolute changes ($bn) Percentage  changes 
  Trade FDI  Trade  and Trade FDI  Trade  and 
  Lib. Lib.  FDI  Lib. Lib. Lib.  FDI  Lib. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Real GDP 
UCAN
a  13.8   324.2  341.8  0.2  4.7   5.0  
Japan  48.6   -5.7  37.0  1.3  -0.2   1.0  
NIEs
b  20.4   28.5  48.4  2.2  3.1   5.3  
ASEAN-4  9.0   38.9  53.7  2.5  10.7   14.9  
China  10.6   20.9  35.2  2.1  4.2   7.1  
ROW  -2.7   -67.9  -74.9  0.0  -0.6   -0.7  
World  99.7   338.9  441.2  0.4  1.5   1.9  
  Aggregate Imports 
UCAN  189.9   2.0  194.1  23.4  0.3   23.9  
Japan  130.7   18.9  154.2  40.0  5.8   47.2  
NIEs  92.2   12.5  109.6  19.8  2.7   23.5  
ASEAN-4  36.2   10.9  53.9  27.4  8.2   40.8  
China  57.3   5.3  65.5  64.8  6.0   74.2  
ROW  25.6   30.7  61.6  1.6  1.9   3.8  
  Aggregate Exports 
UCAN  177.6   99.6  281.7  23.2  13.0   36.9  
Japan  121.4   -24.9  95.2  31.5  -6.5   24.7  
NIEs  94.2   15.1  112.2  23.8  3.8   28.4  
ASEAN-4 44.7    28.5  85.9 32.3 20.6    62.1   
China  64.4   13.3  84.0  46.4  9.5   60.5  
ROW  -14.7   -56.8  -72.4  -1.0  -4.0   -5.1  
  Inward FDI Stocks 
UCAN  2.4   60.0  62.9  3.8  93.6   98.1  
Japan  0.2   2.3  2.5  5.3  51.8   57.4  
NIEs  0.9   7.1  8.1  4.5  34.9   40.1  
ASEAN-4  0.8   8.5  10.2  4.0  41.5   50.3  
China  1.0   3.2  4.7  22.1  70.5   104.1  
ROW  -1.6    -4.3 -6.1 -1.3 -3.7    -5.2   
  Outward FDI Stocks 
UCAN  -0.4   13.2  12.7  -0.6  19.2   18.4  
Japan  1.8   22.2  25.0  4.7  57.8   64.9  
NIEs  0.7   4.6  5.7  6.0  39.8   49.1  
ASEAN-4  0.1   0.4  0.5  11.4  40.0   54.7  
China  0.0   0.1  0.1  13.2  55.3   72.5  
ROW  1.6   36.2  38.5  1.4  32.4   34.4  
Notes: a) United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
  b) Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
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  The real GDP effect of FDI liberalization depends upon whether a region attracts 
or loses foreign capital, which in turn is affected by the magnitude of initial FDI barriers, 
the share of output produced by multinational firms in total output, and the initial stock of 
inward FDI relative to outward FDI, among many factors. UCAN, NIEs, ASEAN-4, and 
China would realize gains in real GDP because the increase in the inward FDI stock is 
larger than the increase in the outward FDI stock while the opposite is the case for Japan 
and ROW (column 2 of Table 4).
9  In percentage terms the impact on real GDP is 
extremely large in ASEAN-4 largely because the share of output produced by 
multinational firms in total output is the highest among the APEC regions.
10 A  large 
injection of new foreign capital to the already high initial inward FDI stock relative to the 
total capital stock would substantially expand output of multinational firms located in 
ASEAN-4. 
  The results reported in Table 4 suggest that at the aggregate level, trade and FDI 
exhibit a complementary relationship. That is, an increase in imports resulting from trade 
liberalization leads to an increase in inward FDI (column 4), and a rise in inward FDI 
resulting from FDI liberalization induces an expansion of imports (column 5). Home 
sourcing of intermediate inputs by foreign subsidiaries can partly explain the latter 
causality. We have no strong reason to believe why the removal of trade barriers would 
attract foreign capital at the aggregate level, and we postpone our assessment until we 
examine the sectoral results. 
4.2 Sectoral  Results 
  Tables 5 and 6 present each region’s sectoral adjustments in output, trade, and 
inward and outward FDI stocks for the three experiments. Not only the magnitude of the 
adjustments but the sign often changes with the transition to a more microeconomic 
perspective. The removal of trade barriers is expected to lead to large contractions in 
output of primary products in Japan and NIEs, resulting from a sharp increase in demand 
for imported goods. Since UCAN and China export relatively large shares of their primary 
                                                 
9 FDI liberalization would raise after-tax rate of return to capital in APEC regions relative to ROW. 
This induces capital to move from ROW to APEC regions, reducing the capital stock and output 
produced in ROW. 
10 For individual APEC economies, this share is the highest in Singapore, followed by Hong Kong. 
For the regional aggregation used in this paper, however, the share is significantly higher in 
ASEAN-4 than the NIEs. 15 
products to Japan and NIEs, export expansion resulting from trade liberalization would 
sharply raise domestic output. This appears to cause a strong resource-pull effect in 
UCAN and China. As the primary sector expands substantially in these regions, factors of 
production would be diverted from the manufacturing and services sectors, causing an 
output contraction in these sectors. However, this assumes that labor is homogeneous and 
perfectly mobile across sectors. If labor demand was disaggregated by type and skill, 
however, limited labor mobility might dampen contraction in non-primary sectors. 
  The manufacturing output in Japan, NIEs, and ASEAN-4 increases, driven by 
export expansion. Had more disaggregated data been available, we would expect that 
output of some labor-intensive sectors (such as processed food and apparel) to contract in 
Japan and that output of some capital-intensive sectors (such as steel and transportation 
equipment) to decline in ASEAN-4.
11 
  FDI liberalization leads to an expansion of output in all three sectors in UCAN, 
NIEs, ASEAN-4, and China (Table 5). As already mentioned in section 4.1, the regions 
that attract net inward FDI experience a positive output effect. Extremely large percentage 
increases in both inward and outward FDI in services are observed (Table 6). This is 
because the rates of FDI protection are highest in the services sector in every region. 
Although not reported in Table 6, the absolute change in the services sector’s inward FDI 
stock is larger than that in its outward FDI stock in every APEC region except Japan.
12 An 
increase in output of services in Japan may be attributable to inter-sectoral domestic 
capital mobility. With primary production declining, capital installed in that sector moves 
to manufacturing and services, with the latter more important than the net decline in FDI. 
Note that in ASEAN-4 output of manufactures is expected to rise more drastically than 
output of services mainly because the share of output produced by multinational firms in 
total output is several times greater in manufactures (0.69) than in services (0.09). There 
might also be some feedback from ‘home’ inputs from FDI installed abroad although the 
magnitude is probably not large. 
 
                                                 
11 Because of data limitations on FDI, we were not able to disaggregate the manufacturing sector 
further. See Lee, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe (1999) for the sectoral output effects of 
APEC trade liberalization at a 20-sector level of disaggregation. 
12 In Japan the inward FDI in services increases from $0.5 billion to $2.1 billion, whereas the 
outward FDI in services increases from $10.7 billion to $28.6 billion. 16 
 
Table 5. Sectoral results from APEC liberalization 
(percentage changes) 
   UCAN
a Japan NIEs
b ASEAN-4 China  ROW 
          
   Output 
Trade liberalization  Primary  11.8 -32.7 -20.3 -7.4 5.9  -1.9
  Manufacturing  -3.8 4.2 10.0 10.3 -5.6  -0.1
  Services  -0.1 0.8 0.5 1.7 -0.8  0.3
FDI liberalization  Primary  3.5 -2.3 7.4 5.3 1.2  -1.5
 Manufacturing  4.3 -1.2 1.3 18.9 5.0  -1.1
 Services  5.3 0.3 2.8 9.2 4.3  -0.3
Trade & FDI liberalization Primary  15.6 -35.0 -13.3 -2.4 6.9  -3.3
  Manufacturing  0.6 2.8 11.4 35.0 0.8  -1.4
  Services  5.2 1.1 3.3 10.7 3.5  0.0
          
   Imports 
Trade liberalization  Primary  13.8 79.7 59.9 39.5 39.5  -0.3
  Manufacturing  28.4 35.2 15.8 27.8 71.2  2.6
  Services  -0.9 5.6 4.1 -10.5 -5.1  -0.2
FDI liberalization  Primary  -0.5 1.8 -0.3 14.3 8.8  0.9
 Manufacturing  1.7 8.1 3.5 8.0 5.7  1.8
 Services  -8.9 6.3 0.1 -5.3 4.0  3.0
Trade & FDI liberalization Primary  14.5 83.6 61.6 61.2 52.3  0.6
  Manufacturing  30.2 45.9 20.4 40.8 80.3  4.9
  Services  -9.2 10.5 4.4 -13.4 -1.3  2.7
          
   Exports 
Trade liberalization  Primary  136.0 26.3 13.2 -12.7 155.4  -12.2
  Manufacturing  9.6 36.6 32.5 50.3 35.1  2.1
  Services  1.9 -7.0 -5.3 27.4 22.6  0.9
FDI liberalization  Primary  10.5 -0.5 33.4 -0.2 -0.1 -4.9
 Manufacturing  12.8 -6.0 2.2 31.5 11.5  -3.5
 Services  15.1 -10.5 -1.8 4.5 -3.8  -4.8
Trade & FDI liberalization Primary  150.3 32.5 49.4 -15.8 150.4  -16.3
  Manufacturing  22.9 29.8 35.5 98.1 52.6  -1.8
  Services  16.0 -14.6 -7.2 27.8 18.4  -3.8
Notes:  a) United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
  b) Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
 
 
  For UCAN and China, expansions of the manufacturing and services sectors under 
FDI liberalization are larger than contractions of these sectors under trade liberalization, 
resulting in expansions of all three sectors in these regions when both trade and FDI are 
liberalized. For Japan, NIEs, and ASEAN-4, the combination of trade and FDI 
liberalization leads to expansions of manufacturing and services output. 
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Table 6. Sectoral FDI impacts results from APEC liberalization 
(percentage changes) 
   UCAN
a Japan NIEs
b ASEAN-4 China  ROW 
          
   Inward FDI stock 
Trade liberalization  Primary  10.7 -27.5 -12.4 -9.1  51.7  -4.4
  Manufacturing 3.0 8.6 15.6 15.5  8.4  -0.3
  Services  -1.4 1.8 1.8 -5.0  -5.7  -0.7
FDI liberalization  Primary  4.5 57.2 37.9 14.8  16.1  -2.1
 Manufacturing 26.2 15.2 9.7 35.3  76.1  -3.1
 Services  294.3 291.6 150.0 140.0  200.3  -11.1
Trade & FDI liberalization  Primary  15.5 14.4 22.6 4.6  74.4  -6.4
  Manufacturing 31.4 24.8 27.3 61.4  103.4  -3.6
  Services  291.7 298.0 157.0 133.7  189.6  -11.9
          
   Outward FDI stock 
Trade liberalization  Primary  -4.2 31.4 12.2 1.9  -3.4  -0.3
  Manufacturing 2.6 6.4 4.9 18.6  19.9  2.4
  Services  -1.0 -2.7 -4.7 3.1  0.9  0.0
FDI liberalization  Primary  12.2 -1.2 8.4 14.3  64.9  1.6
 Manufacturing 7.3 16.1 38.8 14.7  10.2  5.4
  Services  100.1 168.8 113.9 235.7 329.9 204.9
Trade & FDI liberalization  Primary  7.2 31.0 22.5 16.2  65.6  1.3
  Manufacturing 10.3 26.8 49.9 37.6  33.6  8.7
  Services  98.7 163.8 106.3 246.3  337.3  206.0
Notes:  a) United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
  b) Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
 
 
  Finally, we examine whether trade and FDI are complements at the sectoral level. 
Trade liberalization leads to an increase in the inward and outward FDI stocks of the 
manufacturing sector in every APEC region, whereas it has an ambiguous effect on the 
FDI stocks in the primary and services sectors (Tables 5 and 6). At the same time, FDI 
liberalization leads to an increase in imports and exports of manufactures in every APEC 
region with the exception of Japanese exports. Again, the effect on the primary and 
services sectors is ambiguous. 
  The results are consistent with our a priori expectation that horizontal FDI is the 
most prevalent in the manufacturing sector, where trade and FDI linkages are extensive. 
Thus the removal of trade barriers in host economies is likely to promote production of 
foreign subsidiaries. In the primary sector, motives of FDI might include securing energy 
and/or natural resources for the home country, and this type of FDI is expected to be less 
sensitive to changes in the height of trade barriers in the host country. In the services 18 
sector, a change in trade regime is unlikely to affect the level of FDI extensively because 
FDI is often the only means to provide foreign services to local consumers. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  Despite a significant economic setback experienced by several East Asian 
economies during 1997-99, the Asia-Pacific region has been the fastest growing 
multilateral trading area of the world. In this paper, we have evaluated the impact of 
APEC trade and investment liberalization using a CGE model that incorporates FDI. The 
preliminary results suggest that FDI liberalization would bring about greater benefits to 
most of the APEC economies than trade liberalization. More accurate estimates of FDI 
barriers would be helpful in assessing the benefits of APEC liberalization more precisely, 
and we plan to refine and update the database. 
  In the manufacturing sector, trade and FDI are found to be complements in the 
APEC regions. Trade liberalization leads to an increase in the inward and outward FDI 
stocks, and FDI liberalization leads to an increase in imports and exports of manufactures. 
The only exception is that when Japan liberalizes FDI barriers, it leads to an increase in 
imports but not in exports. However, this may be treated as a special case because Japan’s 
inward FDI stock is extremely small relative to its capital stock. The result on 
complementarity suggests that gains from trade liberalization would be amplified in the 
presence of FDI. At the same time, FDI liberalization would increase both FDI and trade 
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Appendix: Model Specification 
 
Indices 
i, j Sector  indices 
r, s Regional  indices 
f, d, v  Varieties – f represents foreign varieties only, whereas d represents the domestic variety, 
i.e. production from home owned and based plants. v represents both f and d (i.e. it is the 
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International Trade and Transport Services 
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Dropped balance of payments equation 
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Definition of Variables and Parameters 
    
Endogenous Variables 
 
Production    
 
ND
d  Aggregate intermediate demand 
PND
d  Price of aggregate intermediate demand 
WTF
p  ‘Home’ imports for production by foreign-based investment 
PND
m  Price of ‘home’ imports 
VA  Aggregate value added 
L
d  Labor demand 
K
d  Capital demand 
PVA  Price of value added bundle 
VC  Unit cost of production 
PP Producer  price 
    
Income    
 
YH Household  income 
TY
p  Production tax revenues 
TY
k  Capital tax revenues 
TY
m Tariff  revenues 28 
TY
x  Indirect tax revenues 
InFlowY
k  Capital income from abroad 
OutFlowY
k  Capital income flowing abroad 
Inv  Investment volume 
    
Domestic demand    
 
Y
*  Supernumerary income 
XAc  Armington demand by households 
S
h  Household savings 
XAi  Armington demand for investment expenditures 
PINV  Investment price deflator 
XA  Aggregate Armington demand 
  
Trade   
 
XDT  Aggregate demand for goods produced domestically 
XMT  Aggregate demand for imports 
PA  Armington price 
XD  Demand for goods produced domestically 
PDT  Price of aggregate demand for domestic goods 
XMT
Own  Aggregate import demand for ‘own’ imports 
XMT
For  Aggregate import demand for ‘foreign’ varieties 
PMT  Aggregate import price 
WTF
a  World trade flow for imports (excluding ‘home’ imports) 
PMT
Own  Price of aggregate import demand for ‘own’ imports 
FV  Import demand for aggregate foreign varieties 
PMT
For  Price of aggregate import demand for ‘foreign’ varieties 
PFV  Price of import demand for aggregate foreign varieties 
PM  Tariff inclusive bilateral import price 
    
International Services  
 
XWM  Aggregate demand for international trade services 
XMarg  Regional supply of international trade services 
PWM  Aggregate price index of international trade services 
XMG  Sectoral supply of international trade services 





    
Factors  
 
Wage Wage  rate 
W  Value of wealth 
K
Sec  Aggregate sectoral capital supply 
PW  Price index of wealth 
K
s  Sectoral capital supply by region and variety 
K
For  Aggregate foreign capital allocation 
PK
Sec  Price of aggregate sectoral capital supply 
PK
For  Price of aggregate foreign capital allocation 
PK  Price of capital 
PK
n  Price of capital net of taxes 
    
 29 
Exogenous Variables     
    
τ
p Output  tax 
τ
k Capital  tax 
τ
m Tariff  rate 
τ
c  Indirect tax on consumption 
τ
i  Indirect tax on investment expenditures 
ξ  International trade and transport margin 
L
s  Aggregate labor supply 
W0  Initial (volume of) wealth 
S
f Foreign  saving 
P





d  Share parameter for Armington intermediate demand by sector of input 
and
d  Share parameter for aggregate intermediate Armington demand 
and
m  Share parameter for aggregate intermediate home demand 
ava  Value added share in production 
α
l  Labor share parameter in value added 
α
k  Capital share parameter in value added 
α
i  Investment expenditure share parameter 
α
xd  Share parameter for domestic demand of domestically produced goods 
α
Own  Aggregate share of own variety in aggregate imports 
α
For  Aggregate share of foreign varieties in aggregate imports 
α
Ownx  CES share parameters for importing own varieties 
α
xf  Share parameter for aggregate demand of foreign variety f 
α
Forx  Share parameters for allocating demand for foreign varieties across regions 
α
t  CES share parameter for demand of international trade services 
α
mg  Technical coefficient for supply of international trade and transport services 
σ
p  Capital-labor substitution elasticity across varieties 
σ
i  Investment expenditure substitution elasticity 
σ
m  Substitution elasticity between domestic goods and imports 
σ
d  Substitution elasticity of demand across domestic goods by variety 
σ
v  Substitution elasticity of imports for own versus foreign firms 
σ
o  Substitution elasticity of imports across regions of origin for own products 
σ
fv  Substitution elasticity of imports across varieties for foreign firms 
σ
f  Substitution elasticity of imports across regions of origin for firms of type f 
σ
t  Substitution of demand for international trade and transport services 
χ  Share of installed FDI owned by foreigners 
θ  Household subsistence minima 
µ  Household marginal propensity to consume 
γ
Sec  CET share parameters for top-level CET capital nest 
γ
Dom  Domestic capital share by sector 
γ
For  Foreign capital share by sector 
γ
kf  CET share parameter for allocation of FDI across regions by sector 
ϖ
Sec  CET transformation elasticity for top-level CET capital nest 
ϖ
kx  Transformation elasticity between domestic and foreign capital 
ϖ
kf  Transformation elasticity of FDI across regions of destination 